On June 10, 1916, amid World War I (July 28,1914 – November 11, 1918), Sharif Hussein bin Ali launched the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Government and on the side of Great Britain and the Allies. The aims of the Revolt were outlined in a 2,500-word declaration: “The complete separation and independence of the Hijaz, the Arabs, and Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire.”[1] A cataclysmic event, the Revolt shaped the modern map of the Middle East. It afflicted the Arab peoples with untold suffering for the past one hundred years.
In this article, I will discuss three issues:
– Arab attitude towards Ottoman rule.
– Sharif Hussein’s agenda.
– Sharif Hussein’s dealings with British officials.
Arab attitude towards Ottoman rule
On March 15, 1916, less than three months before the Revolt and 16 months after WWI had started, Sharif Hussein telegrammed Enver Pasha, Minister of Defense in Istanbul, outlining his price to support Istanbul in the war. He demanded decentralized rule for Syria and Iraq, not separation.[2] Sharif Hussein reflected the political aspirations of most Arabs.
The political platforms of six of the better-known reform parties, societies, and groupings, formed during the early 1900s, reflect Arab political aspirations at that time. Although, each group was limited to tens of activists, may be hundreds, drawn from the small body of educated Arab activist elites at that time, they represent our only window on organized Arab public opinion during that era.
The Al-Fatat Society (Young Arab Society)
Al-Fatat was ultra-secret. Founded in Paris on November 14, 1909, by a group of Arab students, its purpose was to obtain Arab independence within the framework of a bi-racial Ottoman Empire, Arab and Turk, along the lines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, without breaking down the unity or destroying the existence of the Ottoman Empire.[3]
Hizb Al-Lamarkazia (Administrative Decentralization Party)
Formed in Cairo in 1912 with the knowledge of the Ottoman Government, Hizb Al-Lamarkazia was open to Ottomans, Arabs and non-Arabs. Its objective was safeguarding the Ottoman Empire from external pressure and internal conflicts and rallying the populace around the Ottoman Throne.[4]
The General Reform Society for Beirut
Formed in 1912, it sought reforms within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, not outside it. The preamble to its program defined the Ottoman Government as a constitutional representative government. The First Article stated that the external affairs of the Vilayet (district) of Beirut were to be in the hands of the Central Administration, while the internal affairs were to be placed under the General Council of the Vilayet.[5]
The Qahtania Secret Society
Founded at the end of 1909, its objective was to turn the Ottoman Empire into a dual monarchy, Arab and Turkish with the Ottoman Sultan wearing in addition to his Turkish crown, the crown of the Arab kingdom.[6]
Al-Ahd Secret Society
Formed in October 1913, Al-Ahd was established by Arab military officers serving in the Ottoman army. A high proportion of the Society were from Iraq. Al-Ahd had decentralization as objective. Nouri As-Saiid, a founding member of Al-Ahd, a military commander in the Revolt, and 13 times Prime Minister of Iraq until his killing in the 1958 coup in Baghdad, wrote in 1947: “None of us thought of separation from the Ottoman Empire but our mind was focused on obtaining local Arab administration with Arabic as an official language along with partnership with the Turks in the management of the government.”[7]
The Arab Congress in Paris
Met on June 18-23, 1913, the Congress was the first public demonstration of Arab anti-Ottoman sentiment. It was attended by representatives of political parties and Lebanese and Syrian immigrant in the US and Mexico. The Congress was sufficiently serious for the CUP government to send emissaries to Paris to negotiate with the Congress leadership. In July, the Turkish Government announced that a 13-article agreement had been reached to give the Arab provinces a measure of autonomy.
The main concessions were:
1) At least three Cabinet ministers were to be Arab.
2) In time of peace the recruits are to do their military service in their own locality.
3) In regions where the majority of the population speaks Arabic, that language is to be the medium of instruction in all schools.
4) All officials in Arab provinces must be acquainted with Arabic as well as Turkish.[8]
Although, there was not even an allusion to “separation”, the Paris Congress was, nonetheless, opposed by certain Arab quarters because, in their opinion, it had gone too far against the Ottoman Empire. Al-Mukattam, a leading newspaper in Cairo, reported on September 4, 1913, that a second delegation from Syria visited government officials in Istanbul and accused the Paris delegates of being unpatriotic and wanting to destroy the Caliphate, Islam, and the Muslims.[9]
Loyalty to Istanbul was expressed on a different level as well. Arab soldiers among the prisoners of war captured by the British army during WWI and held in India, refused to join Sharif Hussein’s Revolt. Out of 2,100 soldiers who arrived at the Red Sea Port of Rabigh on December 1, 1916 from Bombay, only 6 officers and 27 enlisted men agreed to disembark and join the Revolt in spite of 4 days of concerted effort by officers of the Revolt army, led by Nouri As-Saiid, to persuade the POWs to change their mind.[10] Although, a variety of reasons might be attributed to their refusal, opposition to the Revolt was undoubtedly one of the reasons.
Arab Christians attitude
The extreme anti-Turkish attitude was more the preserve of Arab Christians than Muslims. By the middle of the 19th Century, especially among the Maronites in Mount Lebanon, separation from the Ottoman Empire became an aim of Arab Christians. Feeding Christian resentment were the inequities of the Millet system that made non-Muslims second class citizens, the 1860 massacres of Christians in Mount Lebanon and Damascus, Christian missionary education, the printing press, the presence and then return of immigrants to America, ideas of the French Revolution that came with Napoleon’s interlude (1798-1801) in Egypt and Palestine, and protection by foreign powers of Christians. The dispatch from the Earl of Aberdeen to Consul Rose in Beirut explains British attitude towards Christians and Istanbul: “I have to inform you that Her Majesty’s Government perfectly approve of your affording general and efficient protection to all Christians in Turkey who may appeal to you against the oppression of the Musulman authorities of the Port.”[11]
Arab Muslims loyalty to Ottoman rule
Arab Muslims (most Arabs are Sunnis) remained loyal to Sunni Ottoman rule for the four centuries since Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) conquered most of the Arab world. Islamic brotherhood between Arab and Turk and the rather good treatment the Turks accorded their Arab subjects, at least until the arrival of the Young Turks in 1909, could explain Muslim Sunnis loyalty.
Brotherhood in Islam
Quranic and Hadith injunctions created among Ottomans and Arabs bonds of brotherhood transcending national, linguistic, and ethnic boundaries. The Quran dictates in verse 4.59: “Obey God and obey the apostle and those of authority among you”. Verse 49.13 declares that: “The most pious amongst you is God’s dearest”. The Prophet had reportedly said, according to the Hadith compilations of Abi Dawoud (d. 888) and Al-Bukhari (d. 879): “I command to you fear of God, and to hear and obey, even an Abyssinian slave.” Answering a question as to how a Muslim should react to an emir or an imam who does not follow the true guidance, the Prophet is reported to have said, according to Muslim (d. 874): “Hear and obey the emir, even if your back is whipped and your property is taken; hear and obey”. Also, according to Muslim: “He who obeys me obeys God; he who disobeys me, disobeys God. He who obeys the ruler, obeys me; he who disobeys the ruler, disobeys me.”
Decent treatment of Arabs by Turks
The Ottoman era in Arab lands (1517-1918) may be divided into two parts: The first 300 years and the remaining 100 years.
The first 300 years
Amin Saiid described the relationship between Arabs and Turks up to 1908 as follows: “The Ottoman Sultans respected the Arabs and treated their leaders and ulama with graciousness and consideration. They were appointed to important positions so that some became ministers and governors working alongside their Turkish brothers in the service of the State, with ability being the sole discriminating factor in favour of Arab over Turk or Turk over Arab and, thus grew the bond of sincerity and loyalty between two nations united in their religion, land and mutual interest.”[12]
Upon his conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1517, Sultan Selim I maintained the previous governor of Damascus in his position. In Lebanon, the Sultan confirmed the feudal lords who paid homage to him such as the Emirs of the Mountains, Kisrawan, Jubail, and Tripoli. In Egypt, he kept changes to a minimum, aside from a Pasha supported by a Janissary force of 5,000 men.
Ottoman officials did not attempt to assimilate with the local population. They had little time to establish roots. During the 280 years of direct Ottoman rule of Egypt, 100 pashas succeeded one another, an average of 2.8 years each. Between 1517-1697, 133 pashas were assigned to Damascus, an average of less than 1.5 years each.[13]
Maintaining the local old holders of power in their positions meant that old rivalries, tribal feuds, and conflicts were carried over. Consequently, conditions in Arab lands largely remained a product of the old local politics of Arab notables and leaders; now, however, subordinate to a new Pasha and a bureaucratic elite from Istanbul.
The final 100 years
Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) adopted Islam as his state ideology to rally the millions of Muslims in Western countries and colonies, especially in Great Britain, on his side. To prove his Islamic credentials the Arab provinces were paid a special attention. Amin Saiid wrote: “Sultan Abdulhamid worked during his long reign, which lasted a whole generation, on attracting the Arabs, keeping them satisfied and on removing every hint of ethnic discrimination against them. He brought them close to the centre of power and opened his doors and treasures to them, so they lived in peace and contentment.”[14]
Nouri As-Saiid wrote in 1943: “In the Ottoman Empire, Arabs, as Muslims were regarded as partners of the Turks. They shared with the Turks both rights and responsibilities, without any racial distinction: the higher appointments of State, whether military or civil, were open to the Arabs.”[15] Sultan Abdulhamid’s Islamic credentials were also enhanced with the building of the 2,350-kilometer Hijaz railway, which was paid for in part by Muslim contributions and from the meager resources of an imperial treasury, which had defaulted on its obligations in 1875.
However, during the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) between 1909 and the Revolt of Sharif Hussein in 1916, the Arab provinces were subjected to a reign of humiliation, mainly because of the Turkification policies of the CUP government. It was during this period that Arab organizations grew steadily seeking decentralized rule. A good deal of the grievances listed by Sharif Hussein in his almost 2,500-word Declaration on June 26, 1916, were concerned with the poor Islamic credentials of the CUP and their secularization policies.
It is true that the condition of the Arab provinces at the end of WWI was pathetic, low income; high illiteracy; poor health care; and primitive infrastructure. But so were the conditions of the rest of the Empire.
Sharif Hussein’s agenda
Sultan Abdulhamid II removed Sharif Hussein from Mecca to Istanbul in 1893 when he was about 40 years of age to stop his meddling in the affairs of the Mecca Emirate.[16] Sharif Hussein and his family were kept in exile under the watchful eye of the Sultan’s until 1908. He had four sons: Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zaid
Sharif Hussein coveted the position of Emir, or Sharif, of Mecca. Despite his bidding, however, Sultan Abdulhamid II bypassed him on three occasions; in 1880, when he appointed to the post Abdulmuttalib of the Zaid clan; in 1882 when he named Aoun Rafiq, and in 1905 when he chose a cousin of the Sharif, Ali bin Abdullah.[17] In October 1908, following the second constitutional revolution of July 23, 1908, the CUP removed Ali bin Abdullah and appointed in his place an old uncle of Sharif Hussein; who died before assuming the post. With the help of Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah,[18] Ali bin Abdullah took refuge in Cairo, under British protection.[19]
Now that the position of Emir of Mecca became vacant, Sharif Hussein lobbied Sultan Abdulhamid II, via the Grand Vizier, Kamel Pasha, for the post, claiming that the Emirate of Mecca should become his because he was “the eldest member of the Hashimite family.”[20] Following an encouraging response from Kamel Pasha, an audience was arranged for the next day with the Sultan, during which Sharif Hussein was appointed Emir of Mecca.[21] The date was November 24, 1908. On June 10, 1916, amid World War I, Sharif Hussein fired the first symbolic shot from his palace towards the Jeroul Turkish military base in Mecca, declaring the Great Arab Revolt against his Sunni co-religionists and masters in Istanbul and on the side of Great Britain and the Allies.
Who helped appoint Sharif Hussein to the Emirate of Mecca?
The role of three parties will be examined: The Imperial Palace, the Porte (seat of Ottoman government) and the British Embassy.
The Imperial Palace
In the confused early months of the second constitutional period (1908-1922), a crisis of authority gripped Istanbul. Saiid Pasha, the first Grand Vizier after the July 1908 revolution, was in office for only two weeks. In forming Saiid Pasha’s cabinet Sultan Abdulhamid II insisted on appointing the Ministers of War and of the Navy directly, instead of only approving the Grand Vizier’s choice. The CUP disagreed. Saiid Pasha sided with the Sultan. So, the CUP forced Saiid Pasha’s resignation.[22] The second Grand Vizier, Kamel Pasha was appointed in August 1908. He lasted about six months as the CUP caused Parliament to vote him out of office in February 1909. On April 27, 1909, Sultan Abdulhamid II was deposed, and his brother Mehmet V was made Sultan.
Although, officially Sultan Abdulhamid II signed Sharif Hussein’s appointment decree to the Mecca Emirate, a weakened Sultan who had little, if any, authority left during the last six months of his reign is unlikely to have taken such an important decision on his own. When Sultan Abdulhamid II had the authority to return Sharif Hussein to Mecca as Emir he declined to do so three times. Indeed, it was this Sultan who exiled Sharif Hussein from Mecca to Istanbul in 1893.
The Porte
Kamel Pasha had a strained relationship with the CUP during his 6 months in office. Bidding the new Emir farewell at the pier before the ship was about to sail to Jeddah, Kamel Pasha handed Sharif Hussein a memorandum. It reflected the lukewarm relationship, if not the hostility, which the Grand Vizier harboured towards the CUP. According to Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, the memorandum stated: “The blessed Hijazi administration is attached to the Great Caliphate directly. Nothing can undermine the holy relationship that connects the Emirate with the Sultanate, including the new constitution. So, perform your duties in accordance with the traditional old ways, may God be with you.”[23]
The British Embassy
Britain was the Western power with the greatest Muslim population—70 million in India and 16 million in the Nile Valley. As Caliph, Sultan Abdulhamid II had a huge moral and spiritual influence over Sunni Muslims, representing some 80% of world’s Muslims. The Sultan used Islam as an instrument of foreign politics. Under such circumstances, Great Britain had to manage its Islamic affairs skilfully.
London was keenly interested Istanbul’s politics. When it was rumoured that Sayyid Fadhl of the Zaid clan was about to be named to succeed Emir Abdulmuttalib in 1882, London immediately requested its Charge d’Affaires in Istanbul to inform the Port that such an appointment “would be an act of seriously unfriendly character, which Her Majesty’s Government could not view with indifference”, and the British Embassy was instructed to use its “discretion to get a member of the Aoun clan appointed in accordance with the promise given to the British Ambassador by the Sultan in March 1880”.[24] Sharif Hussein was of the Aoun clan.
Sharif Hussein had learned that his elevation to the Grand Sharifate in 1908 had had England’s secret backing.[25] Mary C. Wilson quoted Sir G. Lowther’s message of November 24, 1908 to the Foreign Office describing Sharif Hussein as “an upright man who is unlikely to connive at or condone the extortion on pilgrims or other malpractices of his predecessor under the old regime.”[26] James Morris stated that the British Ambassador is believed to have put a gracious word of approval.[27]
Sharif Hussein’s son, Abdullah, revealed in his memoirs that old friendship had existed between the Egyptian royal family and Sharif Hussein’s family. Abdullah referred to five occasions between 1912 and 1914 during which he was a guest of Khedive Abbas Hilmi (1892-1914) at Abdin Palace. [28] Since Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, the Khedive was under British control, which may explain how Abdullah was able to assist the deposed Emir of Mecca, Ali bin Abdullah, to take refuge in Cairo under British protection.
It may be concluded that British persuasion may have influenced the Grand Visier, Kamel Pasha, to drive the appointment of Sharif Hussein to the Emirate of Mecca. Kamel Pasha had the reputation of being a pro-British liberal.[29]
From exile to power
Abdullah bin Hussein described living in Istanbul as a “residency forced upon us by coercion.” “My father”, Abdullah continued, “was taken to Istanbul to be exiled.”[30] Exile kept Sharif Hussein under the watchful eye of the Sultan’s informers. Adjusting to Istanbul’s urbane life compared to Mecca could have added to the strains of living in exile.
On arrival to Jeddah in early December 1908, a delegation from the local CUP arrived to welcome Sharif Hussein as the first Emir of the new constitutional period. They had hoped that a new era of modernization and progress would be ushered-in to replace the primitiveness of the previous emirs. Instead, Sharif Hussein made clear his policy to disregard CUP policies and pursue the traditional old ways, as Kamel Pasha had instructed. According to Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, his father told the delegation; “This land is the land of God and is governed by God’s law… The Sultan who rules in the name of what you call constitution can apply it to his own country… The constitution of God’s land is the Sharia of God and the Sunna of His Prophet.”[31]
Challenges to Sharif Hussein’s ambitions
Sharif Hussein was challenged within and outside the Hijaz. On one hand, he needed to convince the tribes of the great support he enjoys with the Porte. On the other hand, he needed to convince the Porte of his control over the tribes.
Soon after landing in Jeddah, he announced to tribal leaders that “he could secure with one telegraph enough troops to turn the entire Hijaz upside down.[32] In the Hijaz, the Vilayet (region) administrative structure was not conducive to easy relations between the Ottoman Vali (governor) and the Emir of Mecca. Although the Emir’s domain was over the pilgrimage and Bedouin affairs, the lines of authority and responsibility of the two positions were blurred. Conflict between Emir and Vali was inevitable, especially between young CUP men and an old traditional Emir. In the five years between December 1908 and the end of 1913 seven Valis were replaced. Conflicts involved public issues: Preventing the extension of the Hijaz Railway from Medina (completed in 1908) to Mecca and Jeddah, disallowing the imposition of conscription in the Hijaz, retaining religious law in Hijazi courts, as well as personal issues—allegations of misuse of funds, registering large tracts of state land in Sharif Hussein’s name, taxes that went into his account, and using the military police for his personal aggrandizement.[33]
Outside the Hijaz, Sharif Hussein’s hope for a kingdom greater than the Hijaz, even a Caliphate over all Sunni Muslims, was frustrated by the aspirations of four independently minded rivals surrounding the Hijaz. Two were pro-Istanbul—Ibn Rashid to the North in Hail and the Zaidi Imam in Yemen. A third, Muhammad Idrisi to the southwest in Asir, was expressly anti-Ottoman. In 1910, he attacked the Turkish garrison in Abha, Asir. At the request of the Porte, Sharif Hussein fought Idrisi in 1911 and again in 1913 without conclusive result. Eventually, Idrisi signed on April 30, 1915, a treaty of friendship and border recognition with Britain.
The most serious regional rival to Sharif Hussein, however, was Ibn Saud to the east in Najd. Embarking from his refuge in Kuwait in 1890, Ibn Saud had succeeded by 1908 to consolidate his territory east of the Hijaz. A century earlier, it may be recalled that Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi compatriots conquered the Hijaz. It was only due to Muhammad Ali of Egypt that the Wahhabi movement was destroyed. Now, Sharif Hussein had Ibn Saud as his neighbour. If the Sharif’s domain were to survive, let alone expand beyond the Hijaz, Ibn Saud’s power had to be eliminated. Sharif Hussein warned the Porte against the danger of the Wahhabi movement. He solicited their help to defeat Ibn Saud. In 1910, he invaded Ibn Saud, without the support of Istanbul. The results were inconclusive, although Sharif Hussein’s forces captured a brother of Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud signed on December 26, 1915, a treaty of friendship and border recognition with Britain similar to that of the Idrisi a few months earlier. In 1925, Ibn Saud was allowed by Britain to conquer the Hijaz, ending Sharif Hussein’s project.
Sharif Hussein’s dealings with British officials
While in exile in Istanbul (1893-1908), Sharif Hussein was anxious to cultivate good relations with British officials. “He entered into cordial relations with the British Embassy, so far as prudence allowed, and had encountered friendliness,” wrote George Antonius.[34] Some months before his appointment as Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein, an anti-constitutionalist, sent the British Ambassador in Istanbul a “very friendly message expressing his feeling of gratitude to England for her sympathy towards the Ottoman constitutional movement.”[35]
Meetings between Abdullah bin Hussein and Lord Kitchener in 1912/1913
Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah, according to his Memoirs, met around mid 1913 with Lord Kitchener, British High Commissioner in Cairo, for the first time while visiting with the Khedive of Egypt at Abdin Palace. To Abdullah’s surprise, Lord Kitchener just appeared at the palace.[36] According to a diplomatic report to the French Foreign Ministry, the meeting was around a year earlier. “As early as January 1912 the French Consul in Jeddah reported a trip Abdullah took to Cairo with the purpose of seeking the Khedive’s support” and that “the first contact between Abdullah and British authorities may have occurred on this occasion.[37]
British Documents corroborate the French account: “Hints of the aspirations cherished by Hussein and his family had been given privately to Lord Kitchener by Abdullah.”[38]
According to Abdullah bin Hussein’s memoirs, following the Abdin Palace, he paid a reciprocal visit to Lord Kitchener at the suggestion of the Khedive. During this visit, “Lord Kitchener intimated that he had learned that Istanbul might be contemplating major administrative changes in Arabia and that, if there were to be a change in the position of Emir of Mecca”, Lord Kitchener inquired, “would Sharif Hussein accept the change?”[39] Abdullah told Lord Kitchener that his father “would not object, but should the Sharif need protection,” Abdullah added, “would Britain come to his aid?”[40] Lord Kitchner replied: “We have with Turkey traditional friendship that precludes us from interfering in its internal affairs”.[41] Abdullah retorted: “Was Kuwait not a part of the Ottoman Empire when the British Governor of India interfered in its internal affairs at the request of governor Mubarak Al-Sabah”?[42]
With the Anglo-Turkish Convention of July 29, 1913, Great Britain was disinterested in new alliances in Arabia prior to entering WWI [it already had treatise with Muscat (1891), Bahrain (1892), and Kuwait (1899)]. This might explain why Idrisi’s advances for a treaty with Britain had to wait till April 30, 1915, after WWI had started, and why the treaty with Ibn Saud had also to wait till December 26, 1915.
It is noteworthy that Lord Kitchener, according to Abdullah’s memoirs, made available to him the use of a British Navy ship to get him out of Istanbul should he wish.
Communications with the British authorities in Cairo on the eve of WWI
Sir Ronald Storrs of the British Embassy in Cairo, according to Abdullah,[43] sent him in August/early September 1914 a hand delivered letter with an Egyptian agent of Storrs named Ali Al-Bazzar. In the letter, Storrs suggested that an earlier discussion about the Revolt and independence from Turkish rule had taken place between the British and the Sharif side. The letter said: “Since the Ottoman Government disregarded its traditional friendship with Great Britain by joining Britain’s enemy, Germany, Britain has no longer the obligation to honour its old traditional ties with Turkey. As such, are you and your majestic father still interested in your initial position to work towards whatever that could lead to the full independence of the Arabs? If yes, then Great Britain is ready to support the Arab movement with everything that it needs.”
British Documents record that on September 24, 1914, five weeks before Great Britain declared war against the Ottoman Empire, “Lord Kitchener, caused a secret messenger to be sent to Abdullah bin Hussein inquiring how his father would stand if the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany against Great Britain.”[44] Abdullah replied by letter to the effect that if his Majesty’s Government would guarantee the rights of the Emir and the Emirate, support their rights against foreign aggression and give assurance in writing of such support, the Sharifial family would prefer to be on the British rather than the Ottoman side.”[45] Lord Kitchener’s secret messenger was the same Ali Al-Bazzar who Abdullah had met about a month earlier.[46]
The British authorities in Cairo agreed Abdullah’s terms on October 31, 1914, the day of the British declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire. The letter to Abdullah said: “If the Emir of Mecca is willing to assist Great Britain in this conflict, Great Britain is willing, recognizing and respecting the sacred and unique office of Emir Hussein (titles), to guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sharifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans.”[47] “Till now,” the letter continued, “we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; Henceforward, it shall be in that of the noble Arabs.”[48] This message reached Abdullah on November 16, 1914 and “caused him the liveliest satisfaction.”[49] Sharif Hussein, wrote George Antonius, “caused an answer to be sent to Cairo, in which Abdullah definitely committed his father to a policy of un-avowed alliance with England.”[50]
Britain was Sharif Hussein’s best option. If London won the war, and despite the generalities of the communications with British officials, Sharif Hussein was tantalized by the dream of a kingdom over Arabia, plus the Levant and Iraq, even a Caliphate over all Muslims. If Britain were to lose, Sharif Hussein’s position was not going to be worse than the one awaiting him had he remained loyal to Istanbul. His constant bickering with CUP officials was going to lead to his removal from the Emirate anyway. The arrival of General Vahib Pasha as Vali in early 1914 could have convinced Sharif Hussein that his days as Emir of Mecca were numbered.
Sharif Hussein’s motives and ambitions behind the revolt became clear when he proclaimed himself in early November 1916, five months into the Revolt, as “King of the Arabs.” Britain and France had different plans. They recognized him on January 3, 1917, as “King of the Hijaz.” Dissatisfied, he tried his luck again. Immediately after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey on March 3, 1924, he caused Muslim bodies in the Hijaz, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq to proclaim him as Islam’s Caliph.[51] This time, however, his luck ran out. On October 3, 1924, he abdicated the Hijaz Kingdom to his son Ali.
An undertaking by the British authorities in Cairo was made towards the end of June 1915. It stated that the British Government would “make it an essential condition in the terms of peace that the Arabian Peninsula and its Mohammedan Holy places should remain in the hands of an independent Sovereign State. But it is not possible to define at this stage exactly what territory should be included in this State.”[52] The substance of the undertaking was included in a proclamation distributed in Egypt, Sudan and Arabia. Copies of the proclamation were also smuggled to Syria and other places.
Involving Syria and Iraq in the Revolt
Meanwhile, Sharif Hussein communicated with the Syrian Nationalist Committee in Damascus.[53] An emissary from the Al-Fatat Secret Society met in January 1916 with Sharif Hussein in Mecca.[54] Syria’s support was important. It could expand Sharif Hussein’s potential kingdom beyond the Hijaz and impress Britain with his regional influence.
We have seen that the political aspirations of most Syrian and Iraqi political parties and societies were autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, not separation. One of the reasons was their fear from European encroachment. This position was reiterated in a resolution taken by the higher committee of the Al-Fatat Secret Society a few months before the visit by Faisal bin Hussein to Damascus on March 26, 1915. The resolution said: “In consequence of Turkey’s entry into the war… it being resolved that, in the event of European designs appearing to materialize, the Society shall be bound to work on the side of Turkey in order to resist foreign penetration of whatever kind or form.”[55]
Within two months, by the time of Faisal’s return to Damascus on May 23, 1915, Al-Fatat and Al-Ahd Societies, curiously, reversed their position and became interested in joining Sharif Hussein’s Revolt. But, on the condition that Britain would agree to the independence of Arab countries lying within frontiers outlined in what became to be known as the Damascus Protocol Map. The document set the borders of the new independent State in detail.
What caused the sudden reversal in Damascus between March 26, 1915, and May 23, 1915, from self-rule within the Ottoman Empire to separation and independence? Was it Jamal Pasha’s execution of activists in Damascus and Beirut, as Arabs in the region claim? The chronology of events show that this belief is false. Jamal Pasha arrived in Damascus in early December 1914. His two acts of mass executions were on August 21, 1915, when 11 nationalist activists were hanged in Beirut, and on May 6, 1916, when 21 nationalist activists were hanged in Beirut (14) and Damascus (7). Since the Societies’ change of heart occurred around the time of Faisal bin Hussein’s visit to Damascus on May 23, 1915, three months before the first wave of executions and one year before the second wave, it is not possible to link Damascus’ support of Revolt to Jamal Pasha’s executions.
Faisal took the Damascus Protocol to his father. Sharif Hussein included the document in his first letter on July 14, 1915, to Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo (Lord Kitchener’s successor). Less than four months later, the Damascus Protocol was effectively shelved. The Sharif did not inform his Damascus compatriots. They joined the Revolt without the knowledge that their reward was going to British and French rule, not independence.
The Correspondence between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon
Aside from five letters, the first of which was initiated by Sharif Hussein, or by his son Abdullah, to Sir Henry McMahon on July 14, 1915. There is no evidence of a formal agreement between the parties, or a single face to face meeting. This contrasts with the formal agreements Britain signed during the same period with each of Idrisi and Ibn Saud. Details of the Sharif-McMahon correspondence remained officially secret until February 1939, when the British Government de-classified and published them during the London Round-Table Meetings on Palestine.
Four points should be noted regarding the letters:
1) Except for the first letter from Sharif Hussein, which was published in English, all others were published in Arabic.
2) These letters did not reflect the entire discussions between the two parties. In his 2nd letter on October 26, 1915, Sir Henry ended by writing that the courier of his letter would inform Sharif Hussein verbally certain useful matters.[56]
3) The Secretary of the 1939 Conference, H. F. Downie, wrote on February 15, 1939: “It was not certain that the revealed documents were verbatim copies of the originals.
4) Sharif Hussein kept the contents of these contacts to himself. On February 15, 1920, in an interview granted by Faisal bin Hussein to Al-Mufid Newspaper he complained that he never saw any correspondence between his father and the British and that his repeated requests for the correspondence to use as a weapon in his negotiations went unanswered.[57]
The first letter was from Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry McMahon on July 14, 1915. The Sharif included the terms of the Damascus Protocol in their entirety, that: “England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the North by Mersina and Adana up to 37 degree latitude, on which degree fall Birjik, Urfa, Mardin, Amadia Island (Jazirah), up to the border of Persia; on the East by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the South, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the West, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.”[58]
The map came as a surprise to British officials. It complicated matters for them. Aside from London’s own interests, Britain was in partnership with France, which wanted after winning the war to have Syria and Cilicia; and with Russia, which wanted Constantinople and the Straits, as transpired later in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed on May 16, 1916, two and a half years before the war was won, but kept secret until the Bolsheviks exposed it on November 23, 1917.
The second letter was the response from Sir Henry on October 24, 1915. It provided Sharif Hussein with a good idea about his reward in return for the Revolt. Sir Henry wrote: “The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portion of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to these portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, subject to the above modification Great Britain is prepared to recognize… the boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.[59]
The third letter was from the Sharif to Sir Henry on November 5, 1915. Sharif Hussein acquiesced to the exclusion of the Vilayet of Adana, including the Port of Mersina from the proposed State. Also, he consented to British occupation of those parts of Iraq, which were in British hands in November 1915 for a period of time in return for suitable pecuniary assistance. He did not inform his compatriots in Damascus of what he agreed to be excluded from the Damascus Protocol.
The fourth letter was from Sharif Hussein to Sir Henry dated January 1, 1916. In this letter, Hussein appears as if he were anxious for a deal and wanted to elaborate upon the November 5, 2015. He:
– Left the amount of pecuniary compensation for those parts of Iraq in British hands to the “wisdom and the sense of justice of Great Britain.”
– Declared his desire to “avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France in the war.”
– Decided to “postpone” discussing the inclusion of those portions of Beirut and its coasts until “the first opportunity after the war is finished.”[60]
Pleased with Sharif Hussein constructive position, the fifth letter was a reply from Sir Henry to Sharif Hussein on January 25, 1916. The letter said: “As regards the Northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire not to do anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France.”[61]
Observation
The story of Sharif Hussein is a tale of blind ambition, naiveté, betrayal, and tragedy. In his designs to become King of the Arabs, he turned against his Istanbul co-religionists in the middle of WW1. He betrayed his compatriots in Syria and Iraq.
In declaring his agreement to “avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France in the war,” Sharif Hussein compromised himself. A few weeks before he declared the Revolt (June 10, 2016), the Allies were under severe pressure on the battlefield. Gallipoli ended in disaster for them on January 9, 1916, with more than 200,000 casualties (out of a force of 500,000). On April 29, 1916, the Ottoman army took 13,000 British troops prisoners in Kout near Baghdad, along with their commanding officer, Major General Townshend. He failed to turn the Allies’ disadvantage in the battlefield into political advantage for the Revolt. He sold the Revolt for pittance.
As the Allies won the war, the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided greater Syria and Iraq between London and Paris. That the Sharif declared the Revolt only three weeks after the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed did not reflect well on his strategic vision or standing in the negotiations. The Balfour Declaration, made on November 2, 1917, was the final blow to whatever was left of his credibility.
Sharif Hussein abdicated on October 3, 1924 to his eldest son Ali and took refuge in the Red Sea Port of Aqaba until June 1925 when British officials exiled him to Cyprus. Suffering from a stroke in late 1930, British officials allowed him to spend his last days in Amman near his son, now King Abdullah.[62] Sharif Hussein died on June 4, 1931, aged seventy-six. Ali bin Hussein lost the Hijaz in 1925 when Britain allowed Ibn Saud to take-over of the Hijaz.
FOOTNOTES
[1] “Manshour Al Thawrra” (Declaration of the Revolution), cited in Amin Saiid, Al Thawra Al Arabia Al Kubra (The Great Arab Revolt), Vol.1 (Madbouli Publications, Cairo, 1934), PP. 150-157.
[2] Abdullah bin Hussein, Muthakkirati (My Memoirs), 2nd. Edition (Al-Ahlia Publications, Beirut, 1998), P. 111.
[3] Z. N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, (Caravan Books, N.Y. 1976), P. 83.
[4] Ibid., P. 85.
[5] Ibid., PP. 89-90.
[6] George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement, (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938), P. 110.
[7] Nouri As-Saiid, Muthakkarat Nouri As-Saiid Aan Alharakaat Alaskariyya Liljaish Alarabi Fi Al Hijaz Wa Souriyya 1916-1918 (Memoirs of Nouri As-Saiid Regarding the Military Movements of the Arab Army in the Hijaz and Syria 1916-1918), 2nd. Edition (Beirut, 1987), P. 20.
[8] Z. N. Zeine, Emergence, P. 93.
[9] Ibid., P. 96.
[10] Elizer Tauber, The Arab Movement in World War I (London, 1993), PP. 105 & 106.
[11] Great Britain, Foreign Office, 78/575, Turkey (Diplomatic), Dispatch No.10, September 19, 1844, cited in Z. N. Zeine, Emergence, P. 41.[14] H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Muslim Culture (Oxford University Press, 1950-1957), Vol. 1, Pt. 1, P. 160.
[12] Amin Saiid, The Great Arab Revolution, P.9.
[13] Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs (Macmillan, London, 1970), PP. 719-730.
[14] Amin Saiid, The Great Arab Revolution, P. 10.
[15] Nouri As-Saiid, Arab Independence and Unity (Baghdad, 1943), P. 2, cited in Z. N. Zein, The Emergence, P. 14.
[16] Nouri As-Saiid, Memoirs of Nouri As-Said, P. 8.
[17] Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks (California University Press, 1997), P. 149.
[18] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoirs, P. 40 & 41.
[19] Gerald de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (Harpe & co. London, 1951), P. 261.
[20] Abdullah b. Hussein, Memoirs, PP. 20 & 21.
[21] Ibid., PP. 21 & 22.
[22] Erik Zurcher, Turkey. A Modern History (Taurus, London, 1998), P. 99.
[23] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoirs, P. 31.
[24] S. T. Buzpinar, Abdulhamid II, Islam and the Arabs, Ph.D. Dissertation (Manchester, 1991), P. 279.
[25] George Aintonius, op. cit. P. 175.
[26] Mary C. Wilson, “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism”, in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, editors; Rashid Khalidi et al. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1991), P. 207.
[27] James Morris, The Hashemite Kings (Faber & Faber, London, 1959), P. 25.
[28] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires, PP. 51, 57, 75, 83, & 101.
[29] The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, (Leiden and London, 1971), “Hussein”, P. 605 and Erik Zurcher, Turkey. A Modern History, P. 99.
[30] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires, PP. 19, 29.
[31] Ibid., P.37.
[32] Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, P. 149.
[33] Ibid., P. 183.
[34] George Antonius, op. cit. P. 175.
[35] Mary C. Wilson, in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, P. 207.
[36] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires, PP. 75-77.
[37] Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks, P. 170.
[38] British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. General Editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, Section Five, P. 391.
[39] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires, P. 77.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., PP. 107-108.
[44] British Documents, P. 391.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Abdullah bin Hussein, Memoires, P. 108.
[47] British Documents, P. 391.
[48] Ibid.
[49] George Antonius, op. cit. P. 133.
[50] Ibid. P. 134.
[51] Ibid., P. 335.
[52] British Documents, P. 392.
[53] Ibid., P. 395.
[54] George Antonius, op. cit. P. 149.
[55] Ibid., P. 153.
[56] Z. N. Zeine, Alsiraa Aldawli Fi Alsharq Alawsat Wa Wiladat Dawlatai Souriya Wa Lubnan (The International Struggle in the Middle East and the Birth of Syria and Lebanon) (Beirut, 1971), P. 281 & 282.
[57] Anis Sayegh, Alhashimiyyoun Wa Qadiyyat Philastin (The Hashimites and the Problem of Palestine) (Beirut, 1966), P. 55.
[58] British Documents, P. 394.
[59] Ibid., P. 400.
[60] Ibid., P. 405.
[61] Ibid., P. 406.
[62] George Antonius, op. cit. PP. 336-337.