Studies that overlook the influence of religion on politics, or the effect of dressing up politics in religious garb, leads to myopic conclusions. Neglecting the religious factor in the politics of, especially, the Middle East is like navigating the oceans without a compass. Samuel P. Huntington considers that cultural differences create “The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”[1]
The Context
- Collective memories connect old events in the Middle East with the present. In the year 657, on the banks of the Euphrates River, in Siffin, near Raqqa, Syria, Muslims’ First Civil War took place. It was fought over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad between the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abi Talib (656–661), and Mu’awiyah bin abi Sufyan, Governor of Syria (639–661).
- 1357 years later, in 2014, war in Raqqa took place again. This time between the Alawite dictatorship of the Asad regime and the Wahhabi Islamic State. The Asad clan lost. Four years later, on October 17, 2017, Raqqa was liberated from IS by anti-Asad forces of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by a US-led coalition.[2]
The attachment of Muslims to Islam is strong. A 2019-2020 survey in 13 Arab countries by Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar found that 86% of respondents consider themselves as “very religious” and “religious, to some extent.”[3]
Another expression of Muslims’ attachment to Islam is the meteoric growth of Islamic banking and finance over the past fifty years, from around $5 billion in 1980, to $4.5 Trillion in 2022, with 1,871 Islamic Finance organizations.[4]
Islamic Beliefs
To profess the faith, a Muslim must perform the five daily prayers (sunrise, noon, afternoon, sunset, and night), fast during the month of Ramadan from sunrise to sunset, give alms (zakat), and make the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime, if possible. Islam demands the belief in the inimitability and the uniqueness of God, in the truthfulness of the Prophet Muhammad’s mission, in the divinity of the Qur’an, and in the final Day of Judgment. To Muslims, Islam is the perfect religion. In the Pilgrimage of Farewell, the Prophet declared:
Qur’an 5:3: Today, I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and approved Islam for your religion.
The faithful are enjoined in many Verses and Prophetic traditions to engage in holy war (jihad) in the service of Islam against the enemy and against personal sinful temptations. Islam prohibits usury, gambling, and to Sunni Muslims, image representations. It also prohibits eating pork and drinking wine.[5]
Islam regulates every waking minute of a Muslim, including personal hygiene, diet, healthy living, good manners, and family affairs. It also rules the theological, ritual, judicial, political, ethical, and business realms of society. Islam distinctively amalgamates the spiritual and the temporal into one. Islamic law regulates personal affairs, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Islam’s moral and ethical codes demand chastity, honesty, charity, justice, and societal peace. The ulama (Muslim scholar or clerics) preach that God’s Law is unchangeable, sent to Arabians through the Prophet Muhammad as the perfect way of life for all mankind everywhere, as suitable today as it was in the seventh century.
The extent to which the Prophetic Sunna [words (Hadith) and acts (Sira) of the Prophet] regulate the tiniest details of a Muslim’s daily life may be appreciated from the extensive coverage of the Sunna in the six Sunni canonical collections. Shi’ites have their own Hadith collection. Al-Bukhari, the most revered among the Sunni Hadith collectors, quoted some 7,500 Prophetic sayings and acts that deal with how the Prophet reportedly reacted to the myriad circumstances that he encountered day and night during his mission.Five other collectors add to the coverage. A close second in importance is Muslim (d. 875) whose collection contains 7,563 traditions. The remaining four collectors are Ibn Majah (d. 886), with 4,341 traditions, Abi Dawood (d. 888) with 5,274 traditions, al-Tirmithi (d. 892) with 3,956 traditions, and al-Nasai (d. 915) with 5,761 traditions.
Muslims who pray regularly and fast Ramadan may feel as if they commit no sin. The Prophet reportedly said:
Ablution and prayer absolve all previous sins.[6]
Fasting the month of Ramadan absolves all previous sins.[7]
To Muslims, the Prophet is a human messenger of God, without divinity. He is the greatest of all prophets, and to Sunnis, the last and the final prophet. This view is disputed by Twelver Shi’ites. They believe in the messianic concept of the return to the Earth of the Hidden Imam, the twelfth descendent from Ali bin Abi Taleb, the Prophet’s cousin and husband of His daughter, Fatima, to bring justice and prosperity. The Zaidis, or Fivers, believe in the doctrine of the Hidden fifth Imam, Zaid (d. 740). The Isma’ilis, or Seveners, believe in the doctrine of the Hidden seventh imam, Ismail (d. 760).
To Muslims, the Prophet is the most venerated, loved, and honored human being. The tiniest details of every known moment in the life of the Prophet evolved into an ideal standard to be emulated faithfully. The Sunna even dictated the form of greetings and good wishes. A good Muslim must not make his own unguided determination, or worse, follow a foreign custom.[8] Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855), founder of the orthodox Hanbalite rite, the inspiration behind Wahhabism, is reported to have never eaten watermelon because he had not been able to find any Prophetic precedent on the subject.[9]
The Prophet symbolizes the very essence of the Muslim self. There cannot be a greater injury to a Muslim than disrespecting the Prophet. Sunnis prohibit human imaging for fear of falling into polytheism (Shi’ites do not share this prohibition). Such prohibition explains why Sunni art has, over the centuries, been focused on calligraphy and geometrical shapes.
Belief in Predestination
To Muslims, God’s Will determines success, failure, and destiny. There cannot be the smallest of movement nor the least amount of strength to perform the tiniest of tasks without the Will of God, “the most magnificent, the all-powerful,” goes one of the most common Arabic sayings, repeated many times every day by most people throughout the Arab and Muslim world. “There is no escape from what has already been written,” goes another. Daily conversations are dominated by references to God’s will, God’s wish, God’s permission, God’s help, God’s compassion, God’s name, and dependency on God. If a person dies on the operating table, family and relatives usually attribute the death to the will of God, not to a mistake of the surgeon. Even a corrupt ruler is seen as an act of God, just as an act of terror and self-annihilation is justified as being inspired and ordained by God. God’s powers are immense in all spheres. God’s supremacy is loud and clear throughout the Qur’an.
In early Islam, the debate over free will was robust. The Qadarite school, developed in the 700s, was the first Islamic philosophical movement to advocate the belief in free will. Around 748, Mu’tazilism, a spectacular philosophical movement, defended the free will doctrine and the imperative of intellectual reasoning in matters of faith. Mu’tazilism placed reason above revelation. Mu’tazilite thought survived for about three centuries, despite opposition from orthodox scholars. It became the official doctrine of the Abbasid state during the reign of caliph al-Mamoun (813-833). However, orthodoxy won, and Mu’tazilism was eventually obliterated. Orthodoxy shut the gates of personal philosophical reasoning. The proponents of free will lost out to the advocates of predestination.
Shutting the gates on intellectual reasoning was a tragic retrogression in the development of Islamic thought, locking Muslim societies in stagnation, at a time when the Western world was charging ahead with the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution to unprecedented prosperity and military might.
Discouraging Innovation
To those who believe in the ways of the righteous ancestors (Salafists), innovation is a sin. They hark back to the imagined virtuous ways of Seventh Century Arabia. Desert living brings fear of change. Innovation might upset the delicate balance between nature’s limited endowment and man’s requirements. The Prophet reportedly said:
The evilest of all matters are those that get modernized.[10]
Beware of innovation, for every innovation is heresy, and every heresy leads to the wrong path.[11]
The Prophet’s widow, Aisha, said that the Prophet had rejected any deviation from His teachings.[12] Salafists, however, extend the prohibition to, for example, eating with forks and knives, because the Prophet did not eat using forks and knives.
The lack of innovation in the Ottoman Empire (1280-1918), particularly during the European Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century was among the main factors that led to the defeat and dismemberment of Islam’s last empire. While Europe was charging ahead with industrialization, in Ottoman lands, free thought was stifled, intellectual curiosity smothered, and innovation discouraged. Three centuries after the printing press was introduced in Europe, the Ottoman ulama continued to consider that printing in Arabic and Turkish was an undesirable innovation. The long delay in introducing the printing press into Ottoman life explains the rigidity that slowed Ottoman progress. Bernard Lewis wrote, “Seyh-ul-Islam Abdullah Efendi was persuaded to issue a fatwa authorizing the printing of books in Turkish on subjects other than religion. The printing of the Koran, of books on Koranic exegesis, traditions, theology, and holy law was excluded as unthinkable . . . Finally, on July 5, 1727, an Imperial Ferman [edict, or decree] was issued, giving permission for the establishment of a Turkish press.”[13] However, fifteen years later, in 1742, the press was shut down, not to be reopened until forty-two years later in 1784.
Development of Sunni Law-Making
In addition to the Qur’an and the Sunna, two sources of law evolved for Sunnis around the eighth and ninth centuries. These are known as Analogical Deduction (Qiyas), and Consensus of the Ulama (Ijma’). Analogical Deduction is derived from Jewish law.[14] It was formed in liberal Iraq and led by Abu Hanifa (d. 767), the founder of the Hanafite school of jurisprudence. The Consensus of the Ulama seems to have been modeled on Roman law.[15] Propounded by the conservative Medanese school and led by Malik bin Anas (d. 795), the founder of the Malakite school of jurisprudence. Qiyas and Ijma’ enabled what later became Sunni Shari’a law to cover human actions not addressed in the Qur’an and the Sunna. Together, the four sources address, for Sunnis, all likely doctrinal and juridical requirements.
In addition to the Hanafite and Malikite rites, Sunnis adopted two further rites. The first is the Shafi’ite rite, named after its founder Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 820), and the Hanbalite rite, named for its founder Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855), who was the most orthodox and austere among the four rites, and thus the least popular over the past millennia.
Hitti points out that the establishment of these four schools crystallized traditional dogma in such a way that there could be no further development of doctrine or law, and the possibility of forming new opinions (ijtihad) regarding the Qur’an or Sunna was forever closed to the Sunnis.[16] Through the consensus of the ulama, decisions of great significance were taken. Hitti wrote, “The vulgate text of the Qur’an was canonized, the six canonical books of the Hadiths were approved, the miracles of the Prophet were accepted, lithographic reproductions of the Qur’an were authorized, and the necessity of belonging to the Quraish was dispensed with, in favor of the Ottoman caliphs.”[17]
The conquests of Byzantine Syria and Egypt, along with Sassanid Persia, brought the early Arabian Desert people into the comparatively advanced commercial, cultural, and social conditions of the conquered societies. The laws of the Modenese society were inadequate, and because the conquered people were not yet Muslims, the laws of their new Islamic society were not applicable.[18] It is natural, therefore, that the early Muslims would be influenced by the cultures of Syriac Monophysite Christianity and the developed intellectual and cultural life of the Babylonian Jews.[19] For example, Islam’s scale of the five religious qualifications—obligatory, recommended, indifferent, reprehensible, and forbidden—derive from stoic philosophy.[20] Also, in penal law, it is apparent that stoning to death as a punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse, which does not occur in the Qur’an, was introduced from Mosaic law.[21]
Shi’ite Doctrinal Split from Sunni Islam
At the heart of the Shi’ite/Sunni divide is the controversy over the succession to the Prophet. The Prophet died in 632. He left no male children and devised no criteria to choose a successor, nor did He establish an outline of the successor’s authority and duties. The Qur’an does not address these issues, either.
The succession controversy plunged the Muslim community into conflict and bloodshed immediately after the Prophet’s death. It split the Muslim polity over many questions: Must the Prophet’s successor belong to the family of the Prophet? Must he belong to the Prophet’s Meccan tribe of Quraish? Must he be an Arab? Is his rule hereditary? Must he be obeyed regardless of his deeds? Can he be replaced? If yes, under what circumstances? By whom?
According to Shi’ite ulama, it is incontrovertible that the Prophet had “designated” his cousin, Ali bin Abi Talib as his immediate successor. For them, the successor to the Prophet can only be passed from one successor to the next from among the progeny of Ali and his wife Fatima, (the Prophet’s daughter) via their two sons, Hasan and Hussein, through a divinely inspired designation. Sunni ulama disagree.
Shi’ites cite Prophetic traditions from Shi’ite as well as Sunni sources to prove that the Prophet had publicly and unambiguously designated Ali as his immediate successor. Ahmad bin Hanbal, the orthodox Sunni collector of some 30,000 Prophetic Traditions and founder of the most orthodox among the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence that survive today, related that while the Prophet was traveling back to Medina after his last pilgrimage in 632, he stopped at Ghadir Khum (near Mecca) and took Ali’s hand and said, “Of whomsoever I am Lord, then Ali is his Lord. O God! Be thou the supporter of whoever supports Ali and the enemy of whoever opposes him.”[22] To Shi’ites, this plus other evidence, prove without any doubt that Ali was to be the Prophet’s chief assistant and immediate successor. To Sunnis, however, the evidence is insufficient to conclude that the Prophet had designated Ali as his immediate successor.[23]
Ali’s son Hasan, first grandson of the Prophet, had renounced his claim in 661 in favor of his father’s archenemy, Mu’awiyah, the fifth caliph (661-680) and founder of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750) in Damascus, in return for a generous subsidy for life. Ali’s second son, Hussein, was killed in 680 in Karbala, Iraq, while attempting to claim the leadership of the Muslim world from Mu’awiyah’s successor, his son Yazid. The tenth of the Muslim month of Muharram (called Ashura) commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein. Annually, Shi’ites exhibit astonishing displays of emotion, passion, self-flagellation, and sorrow, especially in Karbala, where Imam Hussein is buried.
Authority of the Imams
Aside from the Prophet’s authority, Twelver Shi’ites, the majority of Shi’ite Muslims today, accept only the authority of the twelve infallible imams. These are all descendants of Ali and Fatima, Muhammad’s daughter.[24] The imams have become legendary. Shi’ite writers of every generation sought to prove their unique qualities. For example, the birth of the imams, “were miraculous, the baby imam being born already circumcised and with his umbilical cord already severed; that they spoke immediately on birth (and sometimes from within their mother’s womb) praising God … that each performed miracles and was possessed of supernatural knowledge.”[25]
Twelver Shi’ites, believe that the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Muntazar (the awaited one), the ninth descendent in Imam Hussein’s progeny, disappeared as a child around 874, and that he is in a state of occultation (absence, disappearance), a Hidden Imam, until his return to the Earth someday to restore justice and bring prosperity.
Sunni Muslims reject such notions categorically. To them, the Prophet Muhammad is God’s last and final Prophet:
Qur’an 33:40: Muhammad is … the Messenger of God, and the seal (last, final) of the Prophets.
The words seal, last, final, are translations of the Arabic word khatam in Verse 33:40. The Arabic word, Khatam means also signet ring, band.
No aspect of the history of Shi’ite Islam is as confused as the stories relating to the Twelfth Imam. Momen cites the following version of the story of the Twelfth Imam, his occultation, and return, as the one that is usually presented in books published for popular reading:
The mother of the Twelfth Imam was a Byzantine slave-girl named Narjis Khatun (or Saqil or Sawsan or Rayhana). In the more fully elaborated versions of the story, she becomes the Byzantine emperor’s daughter who was informed in a vision that she would be the mother of the Mahdi. She was bought by the Tenth Imam, Ali al-Hadi, for his son the Eleventh Imam, Hasan al-Askari. The Twelfth Imam was born in 868 (some sources vary by as much as five years from this date) in Samarra. He was given the same name as the Prophet, Abul-Qasem Muhammad. The usual miraculous accounts of his talking from the womb, etc. may be passed over to the only occasion on which he is said to have made a public appearance. This was in 874 when the Eleventh Imam died. It appears that none of the Shi’ite notables knew of the birth of Muhammad and so they went to the Eleventh Imam’s brother, Ja’far, assuming that he was now the Imam. Ja’far seemed prepared to take on this mantle and entered the house of the deceased Imam in order to lead the funeral prayers. At this juncture, a young boy came forward and said, ‘Uncle, stand back! For it is more fitting for me to lead the prayers for my father than for you.’ After the funeral, Ja’far was asked about the boy and said that he did not know who the boy was… The boy was seen no more, and Shi’ite tradition states that from that year, he went into occultation.[26]
While the Twelfth Imam is hidden, the Shi’ite ulama act as his representatives, or deputies, uncovering for the masses what the Hidden Imam would have ruled on all matters. To perform their duties, the Shi’ite clerics interpret the Qur’an and the Shi’ite version of the Hadith collections according to their own personal reasoning, though in the name of the Hidden Imam.
Twelver Shi’ite ulama rely on their Intellectual Reasoning (Aql, meaning “brain”) in making those judgments. To the Shi’ite ulama, Intellectual Reasoning is what the consensus of the Sunni ulama (Ijma’) plus analogical deduction (Qiyas) are to the Sunni ulama.
The concept of the occultation is strikingly like the messianic concept of the return of Christ to Earth. It is curious that in the more elaborate story, the mother of the Hidden Imam saw a vision informing her that she would be the mother of the Mahdi, a story like that of the mother of Jesus, Mary, who was informed by the Angel Gabriel that she would be the mother of Jesus.[27]
Alawites, a fringe Shi’ite sect, believe in a divine triad, akin to Christianity’s holy trinity. The triad is composed of the Prophet Muhammad as Ali’s visible veil and the Prophet’s companion, Salman al-Farisi, as Ali’s proselytizer.[28]
Development of Shi’ite Law-Making
By inventing the concept of the all-encompassing, all-knowing, all-powerful Hidden Imam, and by appointing themselves as the Hidden Imam’s representatives on the Earth, the Shi’ite ulama went beyond the demand of blind obedience to Muslim authority in Verse 4:59, which Sunnis invoke. By expropriating the infallible Hidden Imam’s unlimited powers, the Shi’ite clerics rendered their pronouncements infallible. In so doing, they enshrined themselves as lawgivers.
The Shi’ite masses hold the senior Shi’ite clerics as exemplars. They are the reference for imitation, or marja’ taqlid. A Grand Ayatollah (the greatest sign of God) is a marja’ taqlid (source to emulate). Worldwide, a small number, perhaps around ten at any one time, are Grand Ayatollahs. A Shi’ite in country A, Iran, for example, may follow a grand ayatollah in country B, Iraq, for example and vice versa. The Grand Ayatollahs do not report to one another. They are equal in status. Should opposing opinions arise between two Ayatollahs on interpreting what the Hidden Imam might have thought, the Hidden Imam must manifest himself and give a decision. If he does not, the truth must lie with both parties.[29] The teachings and rulings of a dead marja’ die with him. The distinguishing element among the Ayatollahs is the size of their following, which determines the level of their income, educational institutions, and charitable work.
As the Hidden Imam is thought to be among the body of the Shi’ites incognito, and since the Hidden Imam is considered the most learned and all-truth-knowing, there is always the possibility that one of the Shi’ite ulama might indeed be the Hidden Imam.[30] Such a belief creates a unique aura of respectability and authority around Shi’ite clerics, especially those regarded as the marja’ for emulation. This aura is further enhanced by stories in popular culture of the Hidden Imam manifesting himself to prominent Shi’ite ulama.
Shi’ites can follow the teaching of the marja’ of their choice. Because a marja’ interprets Shi’ite law according to his personal reasoning and, because the teachings of a dead marja’ are invalid, then, Shi’ite law, unlike Sunni law, can, theoretically, evolve with life’s changing circumstances. Though, caution as well as self-interest has limited the initiatives that differ from traditional thought and precedents.
Summary
While Sunni Shari’a is composed of four sources: Qur’an, Sunna, Analogical Deduction, and Consensus of the Ulama, Shi’ite Shari’a is composed of three sources: Qur’an, Sunna (Shi’ite version), and Intellectual Reasoning.
Conflict Between Shi’ites and Sunnis Over the Hadith and other Differences
Sunnis ulama have six Hadith canonical collections. The most revered and authoritative is that of Muhammad bin Ismail Al-Bukhari (d. 870), regarded by most Sunni scholars second only to the Quran in authenticity. A close second is the collection of Muslim bin Al-Hajjaj (d. 875). The other four were authored by Ibn Maja (d. 886), Abi Dawood (d. 888), Al-Tirmithi (d. 892), and Al-Nasai (d. 915).
Shi’ite ulama reject all Sunni Hadith collections. Shi’ite collections emphasize the Prophet’s alleged naming of Ali as His immediate successor and stress the Prophet’s affection for Ali’s children. Twelver Shi’ites assembled four of their own canonical Hadith collections by three authors: Abu Ja’far al-Kulayni (d. 939), Abu Ja’far Muhammad bin Babouya (d. 991), and Abu Ja’far al-Tusi (d. 1067), who wrote two collections. Additionally, three other authors during the 1600s produced highly regarded Shi’ite Hadith collections—bin Murtada (d. 1680), bin Hasan (d. 1692), and Majlisi (d. 1699).
While the Shi’ite collectors lived a few decades after the Sunni collectors, the Shi’ite collections of the 1600s were produced five hundred years later, during the life of the anti-Sunni Safavid Dynasty (1501-1736). Shah Ismail (1487-1524) converted Persia’s Islam from Sunnism to Twelver Shi’ism. He made Shi’ism the state religion to add fervor into Persia’s long running confrontations with the Sunni Ottoman Sultans. Safavid politics, wars, and rivalries with Istanbul could have colored the anti-Sunni Hadith collections of bin Murtada, bin Hasan, and Majlisi.
There are two major differences between the Hadith collections of the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. The first is that, while Hadith traditions to Sunnis record the sayings and actions of the Prophet, to Twelver Shi’ites, the Hadith records the sayings and actions of the Prophet as well as those of the twelve infallible imams. The second difference is that for a Prophetic tradition to be credible to Shi’ites, it must be transmitted through one of the imams. Shi’ites reject the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar (634-644), and Uthman (644-656) as usurpers of the caliphate from Ali (656-661). Shi’ites do not consider Abu Bakr, Omar, or Uthman, or the Prophet’s Companions who supported these caliphs, as reliable transmitters of Prophetic Traditions. Sunnis, on the other hand, revere the first three caliphs and their supporters, as well as Ali. The four caliphs are collectively described by Sunnis as the four rightly guided caliphs.
In addition, Shi’ites venerate the imams’ tombs and other religious figures, while Wahhabi Sunnis bury their dead in unmarked tombs (but not Sunni Hanafites, Malikites, and Shafi’ites). Shi’ites respect historical monuments and works of art, while Wahhabis do not (for fear of falling into polytheism). Indeed, the Wahhabi Taliban dynamited the Buddhas of Bamiyan on March 2001 and the Wahhabi so-called Islamic State destroyed parts of Syria’s Palmyra in 2016, the Mosul museum, and the Ninevah ruins in Iraq.[31] Like the Taliban and the so-called Islamic State, Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia destroyed 98 percent of the country’s historical and religious sites since 1985, according to estimates by the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation in London.[32]Shi’ites display pictures of the imams and the Prophet, while Sunnis do not. Shi’ites permit Mut’a marriage (the woman gets paid for her companionship for a specified period of time) while Sunnis do not. Wahhabis, permit Misyar marriage (the couple live apart, with the man visiting the woman at her home without obligation) while Shi’ites do not.
Shi’ism may be described as a Persianized version of Arabian Islam. It incorporates the ethnic and cultural differences and rivalries between Arabs and Persians over the long sweep of history.
Wilayat al-Faqih, or Rulership of the Senior-Most Shi’ite Jurist
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini asserted the right of the senior-most Shi’ite cleric, as the deputy of the Hidden Imam, to oversee all religious, social, and political affairs of the Shi’ite community.[33] Khomeini’s conception means that the senior-most Shi’ite cleric has the same authority and can perform the same functions as the Hidden Imam, without being equal to the Hidden Imam in status.[34]
The new concept is revolutionary, an inflection-point in the history of Middle Eastern politics. It heightened the Shi’ite/Sunni divide, pitting Shi’ite Ayatollahs against Sunni politicians and ulama in the region. Fears that Ayatollah Khomeini would embark upon a crusade to destabilize Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the rest of GCC states following the 1979 revolution in Iran fueled the twentieth century’s longest war between Iraq and Iran (September 22, 1980 – August 20, 1988). Since that time, proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia have destroyed much of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and magnified the discontent among the Shi’ite communities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
Wilayat al-Faqih yields absolute theocratic dictatorship. Control by the Shi’ite religious establishment over the political and spiritual lives of Iranians is vested in two religious institutions enshrined in Iran’s constitution. The first is the Office of the Supreme Faqih. The second is the Council of Guardians. The Council approves candidates for parliament, the presidency, and Assembly of Experts.[35] The Assembly elects the Supreme Faqih from within its own ranks.[36] It consists of 86 “virtuous and learned,” clerics elected by the public to eight-year terms. The Council of Guardians has veto power to reject parliamentary laws that do not conform to Shi’ite religious principles. The Supreme Faqih possesses power over the majlis (parliament), the judiciary, and the executive branch.
Controversy over Wilayat al-Faqih
The issue of a supreme worldwide Iranian Faqih is controversial. Not all Shi’ite clerics subscribe to Khomeini’s construction. His opponents regard the new theocracy as illegitimate, both ideologically and theologically.
There have been clerics who preferred not to interfere in politics. This group included many high-ranking Shi’ite ulama, particularly Ayatollah Burujirdi and his successors, Ayatollahs Shari’atmadari (stripped of his rank as Grand Ayatollah after the discovery of his involvement in a 1982 plot against Grand Ayatollah Khomeini), Gulpaygani, and Mar’ashi-Najafi.[37] Ayatollah Mohammed Kazemeini Burujirdi, an advocate of the separation of religion from politics, was arrested in October 2006 in Tehran amid clashes between his supporters and police.[38] He and seventeen of his followers were tried by a special court with jurisdiction over Shi’ite clerics and sentenced to death on charges, including “enmity against God”. After an appeal, the death sentence was reduced to eleven years in prison. He was banned from practicing his clerical duties. His home and belongings were confiscated. He has suffered physical and mental abuse while in prison.[39]
The Unsustainability of Wilayat al-Faqih
Currently, there is only one Supreme Faqih in the world: The self-declared Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran. He is the first successor to Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. The Wilayat al-Faqih raises serious questions. There is no consensus among Shi’ite scholars on the Khomeini construction. At the heart of the controversy is a dispute over authority. Does the Supreme Faqih’s authority extend beyond Iran? Must the Grand Ayatollahs outside Iran report to Iran’s Supreme Ayatollah?
Hezbollah is the only body of Shi’ites outside Iran that pledges allegiance to the Iranian Faqih. Hezbollah was established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in 1982. It has been funded and armed by the Iranian government, ostensibly to confront Israel, but in reality, to enhance Iran’s regional reach. Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general Sheikh Naim Qassem was quoted as saying in August 2011, “Wilayat al-Faqih is the reason for Hezbollah’s establishment.”[40]
Typically, Ayatollahs have followings among Shi’ites in different countries. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, for example, the leading Grand Ayatollah at the Najaf Hawza (center of Shi’ite learning and issuance of binding religious opinions) in the Holy City of Najaf in Iraq is considered to have the greatest following among world Shi’ites.[41] It is doubtful that Sistani would share with the Qom Supreme Ayatollah any part of the estimated $700 million [42] in annual khums tax (fifth, or 20 percent) he receives from his followers saving.
Where should the Supreme Ayatollah sit? In Iran, by virtue of that country’s size and power? Would he claim political authority over the Shi’ite majority of Bahrain, which is ruled by the Sunni minority of the al-Khalifa clan? What about the Shi’ite minorities in countries like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, or in non-Muslim countries like India? Or should he sit in Iraq by virtue of Iraq’s religious significance as the sanctuary for seven Shi’ite imams—especially, in the holy city of Najaf (the site of Ali’s burial shrine), or the holy city of Karbala (the site of Ali’s son Hussein’s burial shrine)?
Demographics
Many Islamic sects and doctrines came into existence and disappeared. Today, around 85 percent of the estimated 1.5 billion Muslims in the world are Sunnis. Shi’ite Muslims number around 250 million, living mainly in Iran (majority of around 70 million), Pakistan (minority of around 25 million), Iraq (majority of around 20 million) and Azerbaijan (majority of around 8 million). There are Shi’ites in Yemen (minority of Zaidis of around 10 million), Saudi Arabia (minority of Shi’ites and Isma’ilis of around 4 million), the rest of the Arabian Peninsula (around 1.5 million), Syria (minority of Alawites and Isma’ilis of around 3 million), and Lebanon (minority of around 2.5 million). In addition, there are minorities of Shi’ites in Afghanistan, India, Russia, and Turkey.
Shi’ite Rebellions
Many rebellions, though certainly not all in early Islam, find their roots in the controversy over the succession to the Prophet. The Shi’ite partisans of Ali and his direct descendants proved to be prolific producers of heterodoxies. Momen lists 51 sects that arose during the first two and a half centuries after the death of the Prophet.[43] The majority of these sects disappeared. Many of the doctrines and concepts behind these groups, however, were incorporated into the development of Twelver Shi’ism in the Tenth Century. What follows is a description of three surviving Shi’ite sects: Zaidis, Isma’ilis, and Atawites.
Zaydis
Zayd died in 740 in a rebellion against the Umayyad caliphate in Damascus. Zaydis are the partisans of Zayd, grandson of the third Imam, Hussein bin Ali, which makes Zayd the fifth Imam since Ali. The Zaydis’ alternative name is the Fivers. The Houthi rebels fighting Saudi Arabia today are Zaidis. They represent around 40 percent of Yemen’s 35 million people. They are concentrated in the rugged Northern Yemeni Mountains bordering Saudi Arabia.
Zaydis advocate that any member of the Prophet’s family claiming to be Imam must assert the title publicly and back up his claim with force.[44] Unlike other Shi’ites, Zaydis do not accept that the Imamate must be “designated,” and they reject that the Imamate should follow any strict hereditary principle, except that the Imam must be a descendant of Hasan or Hussein. Additionally, in variance with other Shi’ites, Zaydis accept Islam’s first three caliphs as legitimate, reject the messianic concept behind the belief in occultation and with it the infallibility of the Hidden Imam.[45] Zaidism is the closest Shi’ite doctrine to Sunnism.
Isma’ilis
The Isma’ilis, or Seveners, believe in the doctrine of the Hidden seventh imam, Ismail (d. 760), the third grandson of the third Imam, Hussein, which makes Zayd the fifth Imam since Ali. Isma’ilis dominated the Islamic stage between the 900s and the 1200s. They succeeded in establishing areas of influence and ruling dynasties in defiance of the central Abbasid authority in Baghdad. Numbering around 15 million worldwide, Ismai’ilis are found in Syria and Saudi Arabia, as well as in Central and South Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and Australia. While Sunnis today represent around 85 percent of Muslims, with 15 percent Shi’ites, the opposite was true around the twelfth century, when Muslims were under the control of one Shi’ite sect or another: the Qarmatians, the Fatimids, the Hamdanids, the Assassins, and the Buyids.
Ismai’lis believe in the allegorical, esoteric meaning of the Qur’an. As in the Pythagorean system, the number seven held sacred importance. The Seveners serialized cosmic and historical happenings by the number seven.[46]
Alawites
They inhabited Syria’s northern Mediterranean coast Since the tenth century. Alawites are about 10 percent of Syria’s population of around 25 million. Alawites are one of the extreme Isma’ili sects. Alawites consider Ali bin Abi Talib, the “incarnation of the deity.”[47] Unlike other Muslim sects, Alawites have a liturgy in their rituals.[48] Other similarities to Christianity include the consecration of the sacrament, the celebration of the mass, and the celebration of Christmas and Easter.[49] Transmigration of souls figured in their cosmology.[50]
The famous eleventh-century scholar al-Tusi (d. 1067), author of two of the Shi’ite canonical Hadith collections, accused the Alawites of heresy.[51] The orthodox theologian ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), the inspiration behind the Wahhabi ideology, condemned the Alawites as being more dangerous than the Christians and encouraged jihad against them.[52]
The Asad family had misruled Syria for 54 years since 1970. To confirm that an Alawite can legitimately be called a Muslim, Hafiz Asad obtained in 1973 from Imam Musa al-Sadr, head of the Higher Shi’ite Council in Lebanon, a religious opinion (fatwa) that made the Alawites a community of Shi’ite Islam.[53] The opinion was politically expedient for al-Sadr. The fatwa was not assented to by Shi’ites’ senior-most ayatollahs, Grand Ayatollah Abol Qasem Kho’i of the Najaf Seminary, or Grand Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari of the Qom Seminary in Iran.[54] Alawite senior clerics then refused to submit to the authority of the grand ayatollahs in Najaf or Qom.
Conflicts that Loom Large Behind the Sunni/Shi’ite Divide
According to the August 2012 Pew Research Center survey, 53 percent of Egyptians, 50 percent of Moroccans, and 43 percent of Jordanians consider the Shi’ites to be non-Muslims.[55] In addition to the differences between Sunnis and Shi’ites over Ali’s right of succession to the Prophet’s mantle and related issues, two cataclysmic events in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are vivid in the collective memory of Sunnis.
The first event was the Mongols’ obliteration of Baghdad and the Abbasid caliphate in 1258. Sunni historians accuse Shi’ites of being behind the fall of Baghdad and the murder of the caliph.[56] As evidence, they argue, that while Baghdad was destroyed, Hilla, the Shi’ite center, was spared.[57]
The second event was Shi’ite complicity with the Christian Crusaders against the Sunnis in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. During this period, Shi’ites, especially the Isma’ilis and the Nusayris (Alawites) often fought on the side of the Crusaders against the Sunni forces.[58]
Recent Shi’ite/Sunni Wars
During their first failed rebellion against Istanbul, the al-Saud/ Abdulwahhab forces sacked in the year 1801 the holiest of Shi’ites’ holies, the tomb of the Imam Hussein.
With the formation of the Saudi state in 1932, hatred-of-the-other teaching in schools, mosques, and the media became a part of the cultural fabric of Saudi society. Wahhabism radicalized Islam and polarized Muslims.
In 1979, the Khomeini revolution exacerbated the Shi’ite/Sunni divide. The long brutal Iran/ Iraq war (September 1980-August 1988) intensified the hatred between Shi’ites and Sunnis.
Then, came the American occupation of Iraq. It opened the gates of sectarian hell in the Muslim Middle East like never before. The G.W. Bush occupation of Iraq and Obama’s inaction in Syria empowered Iran further. Wittingly or unwittingly, Washington ignited proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran that already destroyed much of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and destabilized Lebanon. It also heightened hostilities between Shi’ites and Sunnis in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
An Attempt to Unite Shi’ism and Sunnism
In a Pan-Islamism step, on July 6, 1959, during the presidency of Gamal Abdul Naser, Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, Rector of al-Azhar University in Cairo, issued a religious opinion (fatwa) recognizing Twelver Shi’ism as a “legitimate Islamic school of law.”[59] The text of the fatwa reads:
Islam does not require a Muslim to follow a particular Madh’hab (school of thought). Rather, we say, every Muslim has the right to follow one of the schools of thought which has been correctly narrated, and its verdicts have been compiled in its books. And everyone who is following such Madhahib [schools of thought] can transfer to another school, and there shall be no crime on him for doing so.
The Ja’fari school of thought, which is also known as “al-Shia al-Imamiyyah al-Ithna Ashariyyah” (i.e., The Twelver Imami Shi’ites) is a school of thought that is religiously correct to follow in worship as are other Sunni schools of thought.
Muslims must know this, and ought to refrain from unjust prejudice to any particular school of thought, since the religion of Allah and His Divine Law (Shari’ah) was never restricted to a particular school of thought.
Shaykh al-Azhar, 1959 [60]
Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, father of Iraqi leader Muqtada al-Sadr, preached national unity in Iraq to bridge the Shi’ite/Sunni divide.[61] “Sadiq al-Sadr once called on his followers to enter Sunni mosques and pray. Throngs of followers lined up to do so on the next Friday – a spectacular and unexpected show of force.”[62]
On the level of the Shi’ite/Sunni individual, Shi’ites and Sunnis in the once tolerant Iraq were members of a harmonious community. Marriages among Shi’ites and Sunnis were common until the 2003 American occupation, which turned Shi’ites and Sunnis of the same family against one another.
Footnotes
[1] Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.
[2] Patrick Cockburn, “Raqqa: Isis ‘capital’ liberated by US-backed forces – but civilians face months of hardship with city left devastated,” The independent, (October 17, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/raqqa-liberated-isis-defeat-latest-mine-clearance-sdf-camp-residents-medicine-aid-a8005881.html
[3] “The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief”, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Center DC, (November 16, 2020).
The Index is based on the findings of face-to-face interviews conducted with 28,288 individual respondents in 13 Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-2019-2020-arab-opinion-index-main-results-in-brief/#menu
[4] ICD – LSEG Islamic Finance Development Report 2023, (November 28, 2023), https://solutions.lseg.com/IslamicFinance_ICD_LSEG
[5] Wine is promised in Paradise:
Qur’an 47:15: The parable of the Paradise which the pious and the devout are promised is that of a garden wherein there are … rivers of wine delectable to those who drink it …
[6] The Six Books, Sahih Al-Bukhari, tradition 164, p. 16 and Sahih Muslim, tradition 538, P. 719.
[7] Ibid. Sunan Abi Dawood, traditions PP. 1371 and 1372, P. 1325.
[8] Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, ed. S. M. Stern, translated by C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern, Vol. II. (Aldine Atherton, Chicago and New York, 1967, first published 1890), P. 29.
[9] Noel J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, (At the University Press, Edinburgh, 1999), P. 71.
[10] The Six Books, Sahih al-bukhari, tradition 7277, p. 606.
[11] Ibid. Sunan Abi Dawood, tradition 4607, P. 1561 and Sunan Ibn Maja, traditions 43 to 46, P. 2479.
[12] Ibid. tradition 4606, p. 1561 and Sunan Ibn Maja, tradition 14, p. 2477.
[13] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1961), P. 51.
[14] Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1982), P. 21.
[15] Ibid. P. 20.
[16] Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th edition (MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1970), PP. 399-400.
[17] Ibid. P. 398.
[18] Philip Hitti, Syria: A Short History (MacMillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1959), P. 113.
[19] Hugh Kennedy. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century, (Longman, London and New York: 1996), P. 119.
[20] Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law., P. 20.,rmer US ACncer andakih for S w, ion,” Generation of Weapons,”he Region,”ould be the removal of Asad from Damascus. Whether such,rmer US ACncer andakih for S w, ion,” Generation of Weapons,”he Region,”ould be the removal of Asad from Damascus. Whether such
[21] Ibid. P. 15.
[22] Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1985), P. 199.
[23] Sunnis and Shi’ites disagree on many issues, including the number of children the Prophet had. Shi’ites believe that Fatima was the Prophet’s only biological daughter. Sunnis believe that the Prophet fathered three other daughters in addition to Fatima—Umm Kulthum, Ruqayah, and Zainab. Sunnis believe that these three girls were the biological daughters of the Prophet and his first wife Khadija. Shi’ite scholars, however, dispute the claim. They argue that Fatima was the Prophet’s only biological daughter. They contend that Khadija was too old to have given birth to so many children after her marriage to the Prophet, supposedly at the age of forty. Shi’ite scholars argue that the girls were more likely the daughters of Khadija’s second husband, or even the daughters of Khadija’s deceased sister, Hala, whom Khadija brought up after Hala’s death, possibly before Khadija married the Prophet.
[24] The twelve Imams are: Ali Bin Abi Talib (600-661), Hasan Bin Ali (625-670), Husain Bi Ali (626-680), Ali Zain al-Abideen (658-712), Muhammad al-Baqir (677-732), Ja’far al-Sadek (702-765), Musa al-Kazem (744-799), Ali al-Rida (765-817), Muhammad al-Jawwad al-Taqi (810-835), Ali al-Hadi (827-868), Hasan al-Askari (846-874), Muhammad al-Muntazar (868- ).
[25] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P. 23.
[26] Ibid. PP. 161-162.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Martin Kramer; Editor, Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987), PP. 237-254.
[29] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P. 186.
[30] Ibid. P. 199.
[31] Andrew Curry, “Here Are the Ancient Sites ISIS Has Damaged and Destroyed,” National Geographic, (September 1, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/09/150901-isis-destruction-looting-ancient-sites-iraq-syria-archaeology/
[32] Carla Power, “Saudi Arabia Bulldozes Over Its Heritage,” Time magazine, (November 14, 2014), http://time.com/3584585/saudi-arabia-bulldozes-over-its-heritage/
[33] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P. 196.
[34] Ibid.
[35] US Library of Congress, “Iran Country Report”, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html
[36] “The Structure of Power in Iran,” Frontline, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html#guardians
[37] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P. 19.
[38] Sadeq Saba, “Iran Arrests Controversial Cleric,” BBC, (October 8, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6032217.stm
[39] Tom Lantos, “Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeini Boroujerdi,” United States Congress Human Rights Commission, https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/defending-freedom-project/released-prisoners-country/Iran/Ayatollah-Mohammad-Kazemeini-Boroujerdi
[40] “Hezbollah MP credits wilayat al Fakih for saving Lebanon,” YALIBNAN, (November 2, 2014), https://yalibnan.com/2014/11/02/hezbollah-mp-credits-wilayat-al-fakih-saving-lebanon/
[41] Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Role in Iraq,” Rand Corporation, (2015), P. 4, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151.pdf
[42] Ibid.
[43] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, PP. 45-60.ambition ayatollah Khomeyni , Wahhabis in particular towards Shi’ower configuration threatend endless wars over regional dominat
[44] W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1999), P. 114.
[45] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, PP. 49-50.
[46] Hitti, History of the Arabs, P. 442.
[47] Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th edition (MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1970), P. 449.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Matti Moosa, The Nusairi mass, Extremist Shi’ites, (Syracuse University Press, 1987), P. 405.
[50] Martin Kramer; Editor, Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987), PP. 237-254.
[51] Barak Barfi, “The Real Reason Why Iran Backs Syria,” The National Interest, (January 24, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-why-iran-backs-syria-14999
[52] Patrick Seale, Assad, the Struggle for the Middle East, P. 10.
[53] Ibid, P. 173.
[54] Martin Kramer; Editor, Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, PP. 237-254.
[55] Pew Research Center, “The World’s Muslims”, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary
[56] Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, P. 92.
[57] Ibid. PP. 91-92.
[58] Ibid. P. 93.
[59] The fatwa might have been requested by Nasser.
[60] The fatwa was promulgated at the theological center at al-Azhar, Dar Taqreeb al-Madhaahib al-Islamiyyah (center for bringing closer together the various Islamic schools of thought), https://hastoneest.wordpress.com/2011/09/27/dar-al-taqreeb-al-madhahib-al-islamiyyah-and-al-azhar-university-on-shia-and-sunni/
[61] “Iraq’s Muqtada Al-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabilizer? Middle East Report N°55,” International Crisis Group, (July 11, 2006), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20115/55_iraq_s_muqtada_al_sadr_spoiler_or_stabiliser.pdf
[62] Ibid. Footnote 33, P. 5.